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Evidence, Persuasion and Diversityi 
 
DEREK ALLEN 
Department of Philosophy 
University of Toronto, Trinity College 




Abstract: My topic is the theme of the E-OSSA 12 conference, namely Evidence, Persuasion and Diversity. I will 
present relevant material from a selection of Canadian legal cases, along with background information as needed and 
commentary. My primary focus will be on two landmark Supreme Court of Canada cases—an Aboriginal law case 
and a case that was both a constitutional law case and a criminal law case.  
 
Résumé: Mon sujet est le thème de la conférence E-OSSA 12, à savoir La preuve, la persuasion et la diversité. Je 
présenterai des documents pertinents tirés d'une sélection de procès juridiques canadiens, ainsi que des 
renseignements généraux au besoin et des commentaires. Je me concentrerai principalement sur deux affaires 
historiques de la Cour suprême du Canada - une affaire de droit autochtone et une affaire qui était à la fois une 
affaire de droit constitutionnel et une affaire de droit pénal. 
 




In section 2, I comment on the three subjects of the E-OSSA 12 conference theme. In section 3, I 
turn to my Aboriginal law case, and in section 4 I turn to my constitutional-and-criminal law 
case. In section 5, I make concluding remarks. 
 
2. Evidence, Persuasion and Diversity 
 
2.1 Evidence  
One of the many books which the late Douglas Walton wrote was titled Legal Argumentation 
and Evidence; it was published in 2002. According to an account of evidence Walton gives in 
that book, for proposition P to count as evidence for proposition Q, P must have "weight of 
reasonable acceptance" (meaning that it must appear to be true), and this weight must be 
transferable by inference to Q (2002, pp. 16-17).  If these conditions are satisfied, then P has 
probative value in relation to Q; that is to say, in Walton's terms, P “proves” Q in the sense that it 
moves "a weight of plausibility" onto Q (2002, p. 214) and therefore gives a reason to accept Q, 
although it may not be a conclusive reason (2002, p. 206). 
Walton remarks that "[a]ll the Anglo-American treatises on [legal] evidence base their 
concept of evidence on [the] key concepts of weight of acceptance and probative value" (2002, p. 
16). The word “weight” refers to "the … probability that a proposition [for which evidence is 
given] is true" and to "the 'persuasive force' of the evidence, once it has been admitted" in a trial 
(2002, p. 21).   
In a Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on "The Legal Concept of Evidence" 
published in 2015, the author, Lai Hock Ho, says that "legal usage of the term 'evidence' is 
ambiguous."1 He gives four senses of the word:  
 
1 Quotations are from section 1 of the entry. 
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Sense 1: Evidence is "that which is adduced by a party at [a] trial as a means of 
establishing factual claims." 
Sense 2: The term 'evidence' can "refer to a proposition of fact that is established by 
evidence in the first sense"—the adducing sense. 
Sense 3: On a third conception, evidence is relational. "A factual proposition … is 
evidence in the third sense only if it can serve as a premise for drawing an inference 
(directly or indirectly) to a matter that is material to the case" (i.e., relevant to the 
case).  
Sense 4: "[T]he conditions for something to be received [or “admitted”] as evidence at 
[a] trial are sometimes included in the legal concept of evidence…. On this 
conception, legal evidence is that which counts as evidence in law." 
 
Definition 3, as worded by Ho, states a necessary condition for a factual premise to be 
evidence in the relational sense. But if a factual proposition can serve as a premise for drawing 
an inference (directly or indirectly) to a matter material to the case, surely this is also sufficient 
for it to be relational evidence. 
Following definition 4 and related commentary, Ho says that "[t]he sense in which the 
term 'evidence' is being used is seldom made explicit in legal discourse although the intended 
meaning will often be clear from the context." 
 
2.2 Persuasion  
In a relevant dictionary sense of the word, persuasion is "the action or process of persuading 
someone or of being persuaded to do or believe something" (NODE 1999). An instance of 
persuasion so defined would be a case in which someone was caused by argument to believe 
some claim and thereby persuaded (in one sense of the word) to believe it. Persuasion can also be 
said to occur if someone is caused by argument to accept some claim. In the second edition of 
his textbook Thinking Logically, James Freeman says that the persuasive force of an argument is 
its "ability to bring people to accept its conclusion" (1993, p. 48). 
The two legal cases I will primarily consider include instances of persuasion but also 
instances of non-persuasion—instances in which, for example, a court or a judge was not 
persuaded of the truth or acceptability of some claim for which reasons were given.  
Each of these cases originated in a trial. According to Walton, the rationality of the 
argumentation in a trial  
 
comes from the rules of evidence, and the other procedural rules adopted by a court…. 
[B]y specifying what counts as 'evidence,' these rules are supposed to place the kind of 
legal argumentation used and evaluated in a trial on a level somewhat above that of 
purely psychological … or rhetorical persuasion…. The rules of rational persuasion 
are procedural, and are meant to model due process, by a normative standard of 
rational discussion. (Walton 2002, p. 159) 
 
 
2.3 Diversity  
There are various dictionary definitions of this word. For example: Diversity is the state or 
quality of being different or varied (Collins English Language Dictionary; online). Diversity is 
the fact of many different types of things or people being included in something (Cambridge 
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English Dictionary; online). Diversity is the condition of being diverse (The Oxford Universal 
Dictionary, 1955).  
Dictionary definitions of “diverse” also vary. For example: Webster's New World 
Dictionary of the American Language (1979) gives two senses of the word: first, different, 
dissimilar; second, varied. The New Oxford Dictionary of English (1999) defines “diverse” as 
"showing a great deal of variety." According to The Macmillan Dictionary (online), and in a 
similar vein, diverse entities are "very different from each other." 
 
3. Tsilhqot'in Nation v. British Columbia (2014): Aboriginal law 
The Supreme Court of Canada's judgment in this case was written by then Chief Justice of 
Canada Beverley McLachlin. She would have circulated a draft to the other seven participating 
judges to invite their comments so that she could revise the draft as necessary. They found the 
final version persuasive, and therefore concurred with it. 
Tsilhqot'in was an Aboriginal title case. McLachlin explains that "Aboriginal title gives 
the Aboriginal group the right to use and control the land and enjoy its benefits" (McLachlin 
2014, para. 18) "subject to the restriction that the uses must be consistent with the group nature 
of the [title] and the enjoyment of the land by future generations" (unnumbered paragraph).  
There is a further restriction, stemming in part from the fact that Canada is a constitutional 
monarchy. The country's head of state is the British monarch, typically referred to in Canadian 
legal cases as "the Crown." The further restriction is that on certain conditions the Crown has the 
right to encroach on Aboriginal title for development or other purposes. This right is based on 
the fact that the Crown acquired underlying title to the land when European sovereignty was 
asserted, or, more specifically, when British sovereignty was asserted. For the purpose of the 
Tsilhqot'in case, the relevant land was the territory that became the province of British Columbia.  
The trial judge stated that 1846 was the date of sovereignty assertion over this territory, and he 
did so on the ground that "[t]he assertion of sovereignty, recognized by another nation, is clear at 
this point in our history" (Vickers, para. 602). The other nation was the United States. The 
Oregon Treaty of 1846 between Britain and the United States set the boundary between the 
United States and Canada at the 49th parallel west of the Rocky Mountains. 
In an introductory summary, McLachlin describes the Tsilhqot'in Nation as "a semi-
nomadic grouping of six bands sharing common culture and history" that has lived for centuries 
"in a remote valley bounded by rivers and mountains in central British Columbia" (2014, 
unnumbered paragraph). In 1998, one of the Tsilhqot'in bands made a title claim, on behalf of all 
the Tsilhqot'in people, to roughly five percent of what the Tsilhqot'in regarded as their traditional 
territory. The federal and provincial governments opposed the title claim. 
The issue went to trial at the British Columbia Supreme Court in 2002. The trial lasted 
for 339 days over a period of five years. The judge found that the Tsilhqot'in were in principle 
entitled to a declaration of title to part of the claim area, and to a smaller area outside the claim 
area. 
The case then went to the British Columbia Court of Appeal. In 2012, the Court held that 
title had not been established. The Court's ruling was appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada 
which held that the appeal should be allowed and that a declaration of Aboriginal title over the 
claim area should be granted. 
McLachlin notes that the Supreme Court of Canada had never directly answered the 
question of how the courts should determine whether a semi-nomadic indigenous group (such as 
the Tsilhqot'in) has title to lands. Since the Supreme Court of British Columbia and the British 
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Columbia Court of Appeal disagreed on the correct approach, she undertakes to clarify the test, 
and for this purpose she cites the 1997 Supreme Court of Canada case Delgamuukw v. British 
Columbia. 
In that case, the Court said that the test for Aboriginal title to land "is based on 
'occupation' prior to assertion of European sovereignty. To ground Aboriginal title this 
occupation … must be sufficient; it must be continuous (where present occupation is relied on); 
and it must be exclusive" (McLachlin, 2014, para. 25).  
The requirement of sufficient occupation must be considered from both the Aboriginal 
perspective and the common law perspective. The Aboriginal perspective encompasses diverse 
factors, including the "laws, practices, size, technological ability [of the group concerned] and 
the character of the land claimed" (McLachlin, 2014, para. 41). The common law perspective 
involves "the idea of possession and control of the lands" (para. 36). It "requires an intention to 
occupy or hold land for the purposes of the occupant" (para. 41) and takes possession to extend 
beyond physically occupied sites, such as a house, "to surrounding lands that are used and over 
which effective control is exercised" (para. 36).  
For the title requirement of sufficient occupation to be met, there must be evidence that 
the Aboriginal group concerned had "a strong presence on or over the land claimed," and this 
presence must be manifested "in acts of occupation that could reasonably be interpreted as 
demonstrating that the land in question belonged to, was controlled by, or was under the 
exclusive stewardship of the claimant group" (McLachlin, 2014, para. 38).  
What acts would constitute evidence of such occupation would depend in part on the 
manner of life of the people. Since different Aboriginal groups may have different ways of life, 
sufficiency of occupation "'may be established in a variety of ways'" (McLachlin, 2014, para. 
37)—hence, in diverse ways.  
Where present occupation is relied on as proof of pre-sovereignty occupation, there must 
be continuity between these occupations. This means, McLachlin says, that "for evidence of 
present occupation to establish an inference of pre-sovereignty occupation, the present 
occupation must be rooted in pre-sovereignty times" (2014, para. 46). There must therefore be 
evidence that it is. 
Proof of exclusivity of occupation requires evidence that the Aboriginal group "must have had 
'the intention and capacity to retain exclusive control' over the lands" concerned (McLachlin, 
2014, para. 47). This could be established "by proof that others were excluded from the land, or 
by proof that others were only allowed access to the land with the permission of the claimant 
group" (para. 48).  
From this summary, it will be apparent that for each of the general requirements for 
establishing Aboriginal title, McLachlin makes one or more points expressly, or, in the case of 
continuity by implication, about the evidence needed to show that the requirement is satisfied.  
The Supreme Court of British Columbia and the British Columbia Court of Appeal had 
diverse conceptions of the appropriate test for Aboriginal title. The B.C. Supreme Court "held 
that 'occupation' was established for the purpose of proving title by showing regular and 
exclusive use of sites or territory" (McLachlin, 2014, para. 27). The Court of Appeal applied a 
narrower test based on site-specific occupation requiring proof that the Aboriginal group's 
ancestors "intensively used a definite tract of land with reasonably defined boundaries at the time 
of European sovereignty" (para. 28).  
McLachlin disagreed with the Court of Appeal on this crucial matter. In her view, the 
thesis that only specific, intensively occupied areas can support Aboriginal title was erroneous. A 
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culturally sensitive approach, she said, "suggests that regular use of territories for hunting, 
fishing, trapping and foraging is 'sufficient' use to ground Aboriginal title, provided that such 
use, on the facts of a particular case, [indicates] an intention on the part of the Aboriginal group 
to hold or possess the land in a manner comparable to what would be required to establish title at 
common law" (McLachlin, 2014, para. 42).  
Turning to the Tsilhqot'in title claim, McLachlin says that the trial judge of the B.C. 
Supreme Court (The Hon. Mr. Justice Vickers) identified the correct legal test and applied it 
appropriately to the evidence. He "found evidence that the parts of the land to which he found 
title were regularly used by the Tsilhqot'in," and this finding, McLachlin asserts, "supports [his] 
conclusion of sufficient occupation" (McLachlin, 2014, para. 55). She adds that "[t]he 
geographic proximity between sites for which evidence of recent occupation was tendered, and 
those for which direct evidence of historic[al] occupation existed, further supported an inference 
of continuous occupation" (para. 57). From the evidence that prior to the assertion of sovereignty 
the Tsilhqot'in "repelled other people from their land" and demanded that "outsiders who wished 
to pass over it" obtain their permission to do so, the trial judge "concluded … that the Tsilhqot'in 
treated the land as exclusively theirs" (para. 58).  
At the trial, evidence was presented in the diverse fields of "archeology [sic], 
anthropology, history, cartography, hydrology, wildlife ecology, ethnoecology, ethnobotany, 
biology, linguistics, forestry and forest ecology" (Vickers, 2007, p. iii).  
Vickers notes in his judgment that "Tsilhqot'in was not a written language until the last 
half of the twentieth century" and that "[t]he history of the Tsilhqot'in people is an oral history, 
accessed by listening to the stories and legends told by Tsilhqot'in people" (Vickers, 2007, para. 
131). He added:  
 
The absence of a Tsilhqot'in written record raises a number of evidentiary 
challenges… Courts that have favoured written modes of transmission over oral 
accounts have been criticized for taking an ethnocentric view of the evidence…. In 
order to truly hear the oral history and oral tradition evidence presented in these cases, 
courts must undergo their own process of decolonization (para. 132).  
 
This process requires a court to not only 'peer beyond recorded history' but also to set 
aside some closely held beliefs about the reliability of oral history evidence (para. 
133).  
 
Vickers goes on to cite a 1996 Supreme Court of Canada case indexed as R. v. Van der Peet, 
meaning 'Her Majesty the Queen versus Van der Peet'. As I have noted, Canada's head of state is 
the British monarch. When the British monarch is female, the upper-case letter 'R' in a Canadian 
case name is an abbreviation of the Latin word 'Regina', meaning 'Queen'. Since 1952, Canada's 
head of state has been Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth the Second.  
Vickers quotes in part as follows from R. v. Van der Peet:    
 
The courts must not undervalue the evidence presented by aboriginal claimants simply 
because that evidence does not conform precisely with the evidentiary standards that 
would be applied in, for example, a private law torts case (Vickers, 2007, para. 133).  
 
In Delgamuukw (S.C.C.), Vickers notes, Chief Justice Lamer (as he then was) said:  
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The justification for this special approach can be found in the nature of aboriginal 
rights themselves…. [T]hose rights are aimed at the reconciliation of the prior 
occupation of North America by distinctive aboriginal societies with the assertion of 
Crown sovereignty over Canadian territory (Vickers, 2007, para. 134).  
 
Lamer acknowledged, however, that "[m]any features of oral histories would count against both 
their admissibility and their weight as evidence of prior events in a court that took a traditional 
approach to the rules of evidence" (Vickers, 2007, para. 136). He emphasized in particular the 
broad social role of oral histories "not only 'as a repository of historical knowledge for a culture' 
but also as an expression of 'the values and mores of [that] culture'" (para. 136). 
 
The difficulty with these features of oral histories is that they are tangential to the 
ultimate purpose of the fact-finding process at trial – the determination of the 
historical truth. Another feature of oral histories which creates difficulty is that they 
largely consist of out-of-court statements … These … statements are admitted for their 
truth and therefore conflict with the general rule against the admissibility of hearsay 
(para. 136).  
 
However, Lamer then said: 
 
Notwithstanding the challenges created by the use of oral histories as proof of 
historical facts, the laws of evidence must be adapted in order that this type of 
evidence can be accommodated and placed on an equal footing with the types of 
historical evidence that courts are familiar with, which largely consists of historical 
documents (para. 136). 
 
Lamer describes oral histories as a type of evidence. I think he was probably using the word 
'evidence' in the adducing sense noted by Ho, in which case he would have considered an item of 
oral history to be evidence in this sense if it were adduced at a trial as a means of establishing a 
factual claim. 
Vickers also cited the 2001 S.C.C. case Mitchell v. M.N.R. (Minister of National 
Revenue) on constitutional law and evidence. In that case, McLachlin, who by then had 
succeeded Lamer as Chief Justice of Canada, said that the rules of evidence should facilitate 
justice, and that underlying what she called the diverse rules on the admissibility of evidence are 
three simple ideas: 
 
First, the evidence must be useful in the sense of tending to prove a fact relevant to the 
issues in the case. [This would be evidence in the relational sense.] Second, the 
evidence must be reasonably reliable; … Third, even useful and reasonably reliable 
evidence may be excluded in the discretion of the trial judge if its probative value is 
overshadowed by its potential for prejudice (McLachlin 2001, para. 30). 
 
McLachlin added that aboriginal oral histories may meet the test of usefulness on two grounds:  
 
First, they may offer evidence of ancestral practices and their significance that would 
not otherwise be available (McLachlin 2001, para. 32).  
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Second, oral histories may provide the aboriginal perspective on the right claimed. 
Without such evidence, it might be impossible to gain a true picture of the aboriginal 
practice relied on or its significance to the society in question (para. 32). 
 
[A further] factor that must be considered in determining the admissibility of evidence 
in aboriginal cases is reliability: does the witness represent a reasonably reliable 
source of the particular people's history? (para. 33). 
 
McLachlin noted that in Delgamuukw the Supreme Court of Canada "did not mandate the 
blanket admissibility of [oral history] evidence or the weight it should be accorded by the trier of 
fact; rather, it emphasized that admissibility must be determined on a case-by-case basis" (2001, 
para. 31). 
In a section of her Tsilhqot'in judgment titled "Was Aboriginal title established in this 
case?," McLachlin said that "[t]he trial judge applied a test of regular and exclusive use of the 
land," and that this was "consistent with the correct legal test" (McLachlin, 2014, para. 51). The 
question, then, was "whether he applied it appropriately to the evidence in [the] case" (para. 51), 
and she concluded that he did.  
However, the Province of British Columbia had argued on appeal that "the trial judge's 
conclusions on how particular parts of the land were used [could not] be sustained." Among its 
reasons were the claim that "[t]he boundaries drawn by the trial judge [were] arbitrary and 
contradicted by some of the evidence," and the claim that he "failed to identify specific areas 
with adequate precision, instead relying on vague descriptions" (McLachlin, 2014, para. 59).  
McLachlin was not persuaded. She said that "[m]ost of the Province's criticisms of the 
trial judge's findings on the facts [were] rooted in its erroneous thesis that only specific, 
intensively occupied areas can support Aboriginal title" (McLachlin, 2014, para. 60).   
But she nevertheless accepted "the Province's invitation to review the maps and the evidence 
and evaluate the trial judge's conclusions as to which areas support[ed] a declaration of 
Aboriginal title" (McLachlin, 2014, para. 62). She concluded that "the trial judge was correct in 
his assessment that the Tsilhqot'in occupation was both sufficient and exclusive at the time of 
sovereignty. There was ample direct evidence of occupation at sovereignty, … buttressed by 
evidence of more recent continuous occupation" (para. 66). 
Accordingly, McLachlin was persuaded that the Tsilhqot'in should be granted title to the 
claim area, and her fellow judges agreed. It was a momentous decision—the first time in 
Canadian history that a court had granted a declaration of Aboriginal title. 
In May 2015, nearly a year after the Tsilhqot'in decision, McLachlin gave a speech at the 
Aga Khan Museum in Toronto titled "Unity, diversity, and cultural genocide." She began by 
saying that "Canada is a diverse multi-cultural state" (n. p.). However (and this is a comment of 
mine), for many years there existed in Canada a residential school system which could be said to 
have been based on the racist belief that Canada should not be so diverse as to include the 
cultures of First Nations: 
 
First Nations … [c]hildren were taken from their parents and sent away to residential 
schools, where they were forbidden to speak their native languages … [and] forced to 
observe Christian religious practices … The objective was to 'take the Indian out of 
the child', and thus to solve what John A. Macdonald [Canada's first Prime Minister] 
referred to as the 'Indian problem'. 'Indianness' was not to be tolerated; rather it [was 
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to] be eliminated. In the buzz-word of the day, assimilation; in the language of the 21st 
century, cultural genocide. (McLachlin 2015: from the paragraph beside note 6; n. p.). 
 
According to The Canadian Encyclopedia, more than 130 residential schools existed in 
Canada between 1831 and 1996. An estimated 6,000 children died in them.  
In 2008, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada was established. It released 
a six-volume report in 2015, several months after McLachlin's Aga Khan Museum speech. 
Volume 6 set out guiding principles and a framework for advancing reconciliation between 
Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal peoples in Canadian society (TRC Report, Vol. 6, pp. 15-16). 
Reconciliation is a prominent theme in the Tsilhqot'in judgment. To give just one 
example, in that judgment McLachlin wrote that Aboriginal title cases "require an approach that 
results in decisions based on the best evidence that emerges … What is at stake is nothing less 
than justice for the Aboriginal group and its descendants, and … reconciliation between the 
group and broader society" (McLachlin, 2014, para. 23).  
 
4. R. v. Morgentaler (1988): Constitutional law and criminal law  
This case concerned the constitutionality of a section of the Criminal Code of Canada pertaining 
to abortion. 
It was heard by the Supreme Court on appeal from a 1985 judgment of the Ontario Court 
of Appeal. The appellants were three medical doctors, including Dr. Henry Morgentaler. 
Indictments were made against the doctors "charging that they had conspired with each other 
with intent to procure abortions" contrary to two sections of the Criminal Code of Canada, 
including section 251 enacted in 1969 (Morgentaler, 1988, p. 31).  
A trial occurred before a judge and jury, and the doctors were acquitted. The Crown 
appealed the acquittal. The Ontario Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and set aside the 
acquittals, thereby deciding in favour of the Crown. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Canada 
found section 251 of the Criminal Code to be unconstitutional and restored the acquittals, with 
two judges dissenting.  
When I speak here and subsequently of section 251 of the Criminal Code, or simply of 
section 251, I mean what was section 251 of the Criminal Code at the time of the Morgentaler 
proceedings. As a result of the Morgentaler decision, section 251 was declared to be of no force 
or effect, but it remained in the Criminal Code, though later renumbered section 287, until 2019 
when section 287 was repealed.   
Stated in a somewhat simplified form, section 251 made it a criminal offense for a person 
to abort the foetus of a pregnant woman and for a pregnant woman to use any means, or permit 
any means to be used, for the purpose of aborting her foetus. However, on a certain condition the 
first of these prohibitions did not apply to a qualified physician who, in an accredited or 
approved hospital, used any means for the purpose of performing an abortion, and the second did 
not apply to a pregnant woman who permitted a qualified physician to use, in an accredited or 
approved hospital, any means for the purpose of aborting her foetus. The condition was that a 
majority of the members of the therapeutic abortion committee for that hospital must have stated 
in writing that in their opinion the continuation of the woman's pregnancy would, or would be 
likely to, endanger her life or health (cf. Dickson, 1988, pp. 47-49). 
The Morgentaler case raised several constitutional questions. One of the questions was 
whether section 251 infringed rights and freedoms guaranteed by one or more of six specified 
sections of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms; this charter is part of Canada's 
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Constitution Act, 1982. The specified Charter sections included section 2(a) and section 7. 
Section 2(a) protects freedom of conscience. Section 7 provides as follows: "Everyone has the 
right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in 
accordance with the principles of fundamental justice" (Dickson 1988, p. 50). I will be mainly 
concerned with section 7, but I will note a reference to section 2(a) by one of the Morgentaler 
judges. 
Section 1 of the Charter says that "The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed 
by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society" (Dickson, 1988, pp. 49-
50). 
Accordingly, a second constitutional question in Morgentaler was whether, if section 251 
of the Criminal Code did infringe rights and freedoms guaranteed by one or more of the 
specified Charter sections, it was nevertheless justified by section 1 of the Charter and therefore 
not inconsistent with the Constitution Act, 1982.  
I will focus initially on parts of the judgment given by Brian Dickson, who was then 
Chief Justice of Canada. As noted, one of the rights listed in section 7 of the Charter is the right 
to security of the person. Dickson asked whether section 251 of the Criminal Code impaired 
security of the person. This depended in part on what would constitute such impairment.  
 Dickson said: "The case law leads me to the conclusion that state interference with bodily 
integrity and serious state-imposed psychological stress, at least in the criminal law context, 
constitute a breach of security of the person" (Dickson 1988, p. 56). For the purpose of deciding 
whether section 251 impaired security of the person, Dickson considered a variety of evidence, 
hence a diversity of evidence, including evidence on the following matters: 
 
Delays in women's access to medical treatment caused by section 251's procedural 
requirements.  
The effects of delays in access to treatment. 
Mortality rates for early and late abortions. 
The harm to the psychological well-being of women caused by section 251. 
The availability in Canada of access to a legal therapeutic abortion. 
 
The evidence Dickson considered on these matters came from diverse sources. They included 
trial testimony by experts and three reports.  
The evidence was relational. It persuaded Dickson beyond any doubt that section 251 of 
the Criminal Code was "prima facie a violation of the security of the person of thousands of 
Canadian women who have made the difficult decision that they do not wish to continue with a 
pregnancy" (Dickson, 1988, p. 56).  
 
At the most basic, physical and emotional level, every pregnant woman is told by the 
section that she cannot submit to a generally safe medical procedure that might be of clear 
benefit to her unless she meets criteria entirely unrelated to her own priorities and 
aspirations (Dickson 1988, p. 56). [This] is a profound interference with a woman's body 
and thus a violation of security of the person. Section 251, therefore, is required by the 
Charter to comport with the principles of fundamental justice (p. 57).  
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He argued that it did not (Dickson, 1988, pp. 63-73). Hence its deprivation of a pregnant 
woman's right to security of the person was not in accordance with those principles, and this 
meant that section 251 of the Criminal Code violated section 7 of the Charter. The next question, 
then, was whether it could be saved under section 1 of the Charter. Dickson argued that it could 
not (pp. 73-76) and was therefore inconsistent with Canada's Constitution Act, 1982. 
One of the Supreme Court judges in the case was Justice William McIntyre. He was not 
persuaded by Dickson's judgment. In McIntyre's view, Dickson's position depended for its 
validity on the proposition that "the pregnant woman has the right to an abortion … and that 
interference with [this] right constitutes an infringement of her right to security of the person" 
(McIntyre, 1988, p. 142). But, McIntyre claimed, "[t]he proposition that women enjoy a 
constitutional right to have an abortion is devoid of support in … [section] 7 of the Charter or 
any other section" (p. 143). Hence, "it cannot be said that security of [a pregnant woman's] 
person has been infringed by state action or otherwise" (p. 142).   
McIntyre's argument did not persuade Dickson or any of the other four majority judges. 
Dickson might have made the following reply: 
 
My argument can be expressed as follows: State interference with bodily integrity and 
serious state-imposed psychological stress, at least in the criminal law context, 
constitute a breach of security of the person. Section 251 of the Criminal Code of 
Canada constitutes state interference with the bodily integrity of pregnant women and 
inflicts serious state-imposed psychological stress upon them. Hence, section 251 
breaches their security of the person. 
 
This argument (the reply concludes) does not depend for its validity on the proposition that 
pregnant women have a right to an abortion.  
 I turn next to the judgment of Justice Bertha Wilson. She was the first woman to be 
appointed to the Supreme Court of Canada, and with her appointment in 1982, the Court became 
marginally more diverse in respect of gender. Currently, four of the Court's nine judges are women. 
 Wilson's approach to assessing the constitutionality of section 251 differed from Dickson's. 
Dickson focussed on the procedural requirements of the section, but Wilson's focus was on whether, 
as a constitutional matter, a pregnant woman can be compelled by law to carry the foetus to term 
against her will.  This, she believed, was the central question that had to be addressed. To address it, 
she considered whether the Charter's section 7 right to liberty gave the pregnant woman the right to 
decide for herself (with her doctor's advice) whether or not to have an abortion. 
 In her opinion, the liberty right gave individuals "a degree of personal autonomy over 
important decisions intimately affecting their private lives" (Wilson, 1988, p. 171). She argued that 
the decision of a pregnant woman to terminate her pregnancy is a decision of this sort and therefore 
counts as a decision of the kind that the right to liberty is supposed to protect. Section 251 violated 
this right because it took the decision away from the woman and gave it to a committee (p. 172).  
 Wilson further argued that section 251 violated the woman's right to security of the person 
(pp. 173-174). 
 The question which then arose was whether section 251's violation of a pregnant woman's 
liberty and security rights was in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice. Here 
Wilson needed a test for deciding whether a measure's deprivation of a section 7 right to life, liberty, 
or security accords with those principles.  Dickson's test for making this decision was whether the 
deprivation contradicts the basic tenets of the legal system. Wilson's test was different. Her test was 
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whether the deprivation "has the effect of infringing a right guaranteed elsewhere in the Charter" 
(Wilson, 1988, p. 175).  If it does, then it is not in accordance with the principles of fundamental 
justice. 
 She argued that the deprivation of section 7 rights that resulted from section 251 did infringe 
another Charter right, namely the right to freedom of conscience (section 2(a) of the Charter), 
because (she said) "the decision whether or not to terminate a pregnancy is essentially a moral 
decision, a matter of conscience…. The question is: whose conscience?" Answer: "[T]he conscience 
of the woman" (Wilson 1988, pp. 175-176). Consequently, section 251 violated section 7 of the 
Charter. But could it be saved under section 1 of the Charter? Wilson argued that it could not (p. 
183), and that it was therefore unconstitutional (p. 184). 
 To summarize at a very general level, the 1988 Morgentaler decision of the Supreme Court 
of Canada drew upon a diversity of evidence from diverse sources. It exhibited diverse perspectives 
on the main constitutional issues and, in the judgments of Dickson and Wilson, diverse 
methodological approaches to those issues. The majority judges were persuaded that section 251 
was unconstitutional, but the two dissenting judges were not, and neither was the Ontario Court of 
Appeal.   
 
5. Conclusion 
The Tsilhqot'in and Morgentaler Supreme Court of Canada cases exemplify a diversity of 
diversities, including diversity of evidence (in one sense or another of this term) and diversity of 
judicial perspectives, and both cases include instances of persuasion. In these ways they 
exemplify the subjects of the E-OSSA 12 conference theme: Evidence, Persuasion and Diversity. 
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i This paper is a slightly edited version of the keynote I presented at the twelfth conference of the Ontario Society for 
the Study of Argumentation (OSSA), June 3-6, 2020. 
